Assessment of Fuel Coolant Interactions (FCIs) in the FBR Core Disruptive Accident (CDA)

Abstract

Application of general behavior principles (GBPs) and consideration of relevant contact modes suggest that only incoherent small-scale fuel coolant interactions (FCIs) with negligible damage potential appear possible with the molten oxide fuel-liquid sodium system as the fuel disperses away from the core into a coolable non-critical array. In contrast to the SPERT-1, BORAX-1 and SL-1 nuclear transients that ultimately led to energetic vapor or steam explosions, the presence of molten fuel and liquid sodium in the FBR core always requires the presence of solid cladding which separates the fuel and coolant and, hence prevents energetic FCIs prior to coolant escape. Furthermore, unlike the CORECT-II experiments which examined dynamic re-entry of liquid sodium on molten fuel pools that resulted in unstable interfaces leading to significant sodium entrapment and relatively energetic FCIs, the prevailing contact mode in the FBR core disruptive accident (CDA) scenario is displacement of the lighter and less viscous liquid sodium by the heavier and more viscous molten fuel resulting in stable interfaces with no significant sodium entrapment and FCIs. Dynamic re-entry of liquid sodium into the core is not possible with the two-component steel vapor-liquid sodium system, since the interface contact temperature upon steel vapor condensation is well in excess of the sodium boiling temperature. A pressure reduction in the steel vapor region due to condensation is immediately compensated for by an equivalent pressure increase due to sodium evaporation. Finally, considering that the molten oxide fuel-liquid sodium interface contact temperature is well below the sodium homogeneous nucleation temperature which in turn is well below the fuel melting temperature, not only eliminates the potential for large-scale vapor explosions as molten fuel streams are injected into liquid sodium pools, but also implies that small scale superheat explosions are possible which are consistent with the usually observed incoherent sharp pressurization events (amplitudes up to the order of 10 MPa and duration of the order of 1 ms). These general behavior characteristics are also consistent with complete fuel fragmentation with fragment sizes ranging from 100 to 1,000 μm, and the absence of significant or damaging FCIs.