Assessing transparency in fisheries subsidies: A notification-driven analysis

Abstract

The availability of fisheries subsidies data has been a challenge since the beginning of WTO negotiations, with government disclosure being historically low. No multilateral agency is currently mandated to systematically collect, assemble and disseminate fisheries subsidies data and the knowledge base remains weak. While anecdotal evidence is abundant, subsidy notifications have not been systematically explored as a source of policy intelligence. By proposing a novel approach to extract and analyze information from WTO notifications, this paper aims to fill this gap and shed new light upon the ultimate determinants of government transparency in relation to fisheries subsidies. By screening texts of notifications by China and the United States under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) (1995–2016), this paper identifies a unique set of 61 fisheries and aquaculture policies. For each, budget allocations or expenditures are extracted, and qualitative policy information categorized. This is then used to measure the degree of compliance with notification requirements (SCM Agreement, Art. 25.3). This paper argues that, while government transparency plays a role in determining the level and quality of notified information, intrinsic characteristics of the notification framework may also work as hindrances to sound reporting. A comprehensive effort that simultaneously involves the content, institutional and technological dimensions is needed in order to modernize the WTO notification framework in a way that creates new and better incentives for disclosure.