Abstract
We analyze the plurality runoff rule often used in national elections and prove that the corresponding choice function is Borda-rational. The compromise level attained in real voting systems is defined. The corresponding measures are calculated for the case of plurality runoff with three main candidates. We investigate the influence of the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives on the rationality type of choice functions realized in multicriterion choice systems.
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