Assessing the Impact of Ca-mpaign Spending in Governors' Races

Abstract

In this article, I explore the influence of candidate expenditures on gubernatorial election outcomes (a heretofore largely ignored topic). I find that spending by gubernatorial contestants dramatically influences the outcomes of these races, matching or even out-performing previously studied predictors of gubernatorial election outcomes. I then deal with two issues. First, I explore possible explanations of candidate expenditures in these contests and find that, among other things, out-party candidates are especially sensitive to spending limits, raising the normative concern that these limits insulate in-party candidates from competition. Second, I explore the possible endogeneity of candidate spending using a two-stage least squares, instrumental variables model. I find that once we account for this endogeneity, the relatively vulnerable position of outparty candidates becomes more acute. These findings expand our understanding of governors' races to include spending effects and emphasize the importance of aggregate-level factors in these contests.