Assessing Terrorist Threats and Counterterrorism Reponses in Post-Gaddafi Libya

Abstract

A little over three years (At the time of writing) following the ousting of Colonel Gaddafi, Libya is struggling to contain the threat posed by rival militias as well as radical armed Islamist groups. This chapter proposes to examine the methods employed by the Libyan state between the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in October 2011 and the summer of 2013 to contain these different factions engaging in armed insurrection against the State. The response to domestic insurgency and acts of political violence was mainly non­violent and focuses around disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of fighters. However, these attempts at containing the threat proved too feeble and even counterproductive, prompting stronger countries such as the USA or France to look into ways of funding and developing Libyan counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency programmes. With the country now divided since June 2014 between an internationally recognised government in Tobruk and an Islamist­driven government in Tripoli – both backed by rival armed groups, the “Fajr Libya” militia in Tripoli and the General Haftar troops in Tobruk – the security situation in Libya has significantly deteriorated, prompting countries like France to consider serious military intervention to help prevent the development and spread of the violence within Libya and to neighbouring countries. This chapter thus proposes to shed light on the security situation in Libya and examine the ways in which the significantly weakened Libyan state has been attempting to implement counter-terror and counterinsurgency measures, before finishing on the role the international community is trying to play in containing these groups and preventing their operations from spreading around the region.