Abstract
This paper addresses a general sampling method to estimate the Banzhaf–Owen value for general cooperative TU-games. It is based on systematic sampling techniques on the set of those coalitions that are compatible with the structure of a priori unions. This procedure is theoretically analysed by establishing a collection of statistical properties. Finally, we evaluate this tool on approximating the power of the members of the Executive Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2002 and 2016.
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