Assessing Power Dynamics: Afghanistan's Constitutional Framework of 2004

Abstract

This study provides a detailed analysis of the Afghanistan Constitution of 2004, focusing on the principles of separation and balance of powers as outlined in the renowned theory originating from influential political thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu. The theory of separation of powers has gained widespread acceptance globally, serving as a fundamental tenet of political thought and constitutional law. Through a meticulous examination, this research investigates the incorporation of the theory within the 2004 Afghan constitution, scrutinizing its manifestation across various constitutional provisions. The constitution explicitly delineates executive authority to the government, legislative power to the National Assembly, and judicial power to the judiciary. However, the concentration of extensive powers in the presidency raises valid concerns regarding the preservation of the principle of balance of powers within the constitutional framework. This study aims to elucidate these concerns and provide insights into the potential ramifications for the effective separation and balance of powers within Afghanistan's governance structure. The analysis delves into the mechanisms established by the constitution to ensure the independence and accountability of each branch of government. It examines the interplay between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, evaluating their respective roles and responsibilities in maintaining the integrity of the constitutional order. Furthermore, the study explores avenues for enhancing the balance of powers and strengthening democratic governance in Afghanistan, considering the evolving political landscape and future prospects for constitutional reform.