Assessing dual use research of concern (DURC)-lessons learned from the United States government institutional DURC policy.

Abstract

Life science research was analyzed for potential misuse in the 2004 report "Biotechnology Research in an Age of Bioterrorism". However, it was not until 2015 that the United States Government (USG) Institutional Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) policy went into effect. Institutions receiving USG funding for life science research are required to scan their research portfolios for research involving one of 15 agents and subsequent 7 experimental effects described in the policy. In practice, this policy was implemented in a variety of ways with varying outcomes and lessons learned. First and foremost, reviewing research for potential DURC is a highly subjective process that differs depending on the risk tolerance, experience, and training of the individuals charged with reviewing research for an institution as well as the review process itself. The information being reviewed also lends to the subjectivity of the process, that is, the experimental data provided. It is difficult to determine whether research is potential DURC without experimental data. Any review process is hypothetical until there is data. Lastly, reviewers of the research should look beyond the research proposals, like how compounding existing research information can create new risks, potential use in other organisms or systems, or the creation of a roadmap that, for example, shows how to create a concerning organism or could be used in a pathogen.