Abstract
The growing number of consumer-grade network-enabled Distributed Energy Resources (DER) installations introduces new attack vectors that could impact grid operations through coordinated attacks. This work presents a cyber-physical model and risk assessment methodology for analyzing the emerging nexus between Internet of Things-based energy devices and the bulk transmission grid. The cyber model replicates the device-level interconnectivity and software components interaction found within these architectures to understand the feasibly of coordinated attacks, while the physical model is used to assess the attack's impacts on the grid. The manuscript questions the validity of previous papers' claims regarding IoT-based grid attacks by addressing key limitations in both the power grid and cyber infrastructure models of those works. The resulting methodology is then evaluated using the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) electrical model coupled with DER's operational statistics from California. The results suggest that current DER penetration rates are not yet significant enough to present serious risk, but continued DER growth may be problematic. Furthermore, the work identifies policies that mitigate these risks through increased device diversity and cybersecurity requirements.
Highlights
The overall penetration level of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) is growing significantly due to ongoing cost decreases and greater public interest towards renewable energy
Emerging standards depend on the smart grid and communication-enabled DER units to maintain adequate grid parameters of individual units based on the system status
MITIGATIONS This paper evaluates the risk and impacts of attacks to Internet of Things (IoT)-based DER devices, utilizing real-world information regarding the diversity of DER deployments and its underlaying grid
Summary
The overall penetration level of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) is growing significantly due to ongoing cost decreases and greater public interest towards renewable energy. As identified by other authors, as DER becomes more prevalent, new risk factors will emerge as the devices are increasingly interconnected with networked consumer devices, vendors, aggregators, utilities and other smart grid technologies. This paradigm is a substantial shift from the traditional Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) security approach, in which security depends heavily on the isolation of critical networks. Challenges must be addressed by the utility to manage this emerging risk, the development of new methodologies to identify, measure and mitigate threats to grid operations on DER-targeted attacks. Recommendations to limit the effects of a cyber-attack are provided
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