Assessing Commitment in the United States and Japan: A Comment on Besser

Abstract

W hether Japanese workers are more committed to their employing organizations than are U.S. workers has been the subject of considerable comparative research and speculation. Besser reviews our research (Cole 1979; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1985, 1990) on this topic and reaches two major conclusions. First, she argues that U.S. manufacturing employees are more committed than are Japanese workers in terms of work attitudes, like loyalty and identification, even though the Japanese display more committed behaviors, like absenteeism and quit rates. The Japanese advantage in behavioral allegedly stems largely from social pressures (e.g., pressures to conform to work group norms) rather than individual loyalty to, identification with, or involvement in the organization. Second, Besser alleges that we selectively interpreted our data to support the hypothesis of an commitment gap favoring the Japanese. Besser's first point is a plausible alternative interpretation of the evidence, although it is not our interpretation. However, we feel there is no basis for her second claim. Besser's quote from Lincoln and Kalleberg (p. 876) illustrates our awareness of the distinction between and behavioral aspects of and our recognition that behavioral is rooted in social norms and pressures. Clearly, there is no precise relationship between attitudes and behavior. Cole (1979, p. 235) is also explicit on this point. Besser's arguments along these lines are consistent with the tone of our work. Where we and Besser differ on this issue is primarily in rhetoric and in different understandings of commitment. Consider, for example, Besser's discussion of the measure based on whether a worker would look for another job if his/her current employer experienced a prolonged decline in business (Whitehill and Takezawa 1968; Takezawa and Whitehill 1981). While the answers to this question suggest that the Japanese are responding to external pressures by staying with their employer (although the penalties for changing jobs in Japan are not so severe as Besser describes), we think that the calculus Besser describes is consistent with our own understanding of the concept of commitment. We can use the Toyota example to make the same point. Describing Toyota's Georgetown plant, Besser argues that low rates of absenteeism do not necessarily indicate a highly committed work force (p. 879). Surely absenteeism in Japanese-managed plants is held by peer pressures and other factors unrelated to attitudes of individuals. At the same time, many of the normative and team-based controls for which Japanese organizations are famous could not function without a high degree of individual acceptance and compliance. We explicitly acknowledge that behavioral in the Japanese workplace has both structural and sources; portraying our work as extreme attitudinal determinism is inaccurate. Moreover, despite initial appearances from survey data, most evidence does not support the conclusion that American manufacturing workers feel greater personal loyalty to their firms than do Japanese workers, or that structural controls wholly explain the Japanese advantage in behavioral commitment. Besser performs a useful service by underscoring the distinction between and behavioral dimensions of commitment, and by reminding us that we should always ask: to what? In recent work, Lincoln and Kalleberg (1993) distinguish between identifi* Direct all correspondence to: Arne L. Kalleberg, Department of Sociology, CB #3210 Hamilton Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3210.