Abstract
How states assess the capabilities of their adversaries and rivals is of paramount importance to the theory and practice of international relations. This paper presents a framework for understanding why states overestimate the capabilities of their adversaries. Three types of overestimation are presented, consisting of conscious/rational, erroneous and biased overestimation. In order to demonstrate the phenomenon of biased overestimation in international politics, the case of the ‘Missile Gap’ (1957–61) controversy in the United States is examined.
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