Abstract
A common threat to democratic politics in developing countries is state interference with the independent media. Despite the importance of this, we know very little about when and why governments attack the media. In this study we explain media harassment in Africa with a theory focusing on varying government incentives to control information over time. We propose that media harassment will increase when governments face threats to maintaining power or undertake extraordinary efforts to consolidate power. Leveraging an original dataset that covers 15 years and 23 countries, our findings offer support for this. Media harassment increases when governments are faced with major protests, coup plots, and conflict onsets and when they are seeking to amend constitutions in ways that increase or extend their power.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
