Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games. Edited by SumitGanguly and William R.Thompson. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011. 272 pp., $24.95 (ISBN-10: 0-08047-7596-6; ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-7596-0).

Abstract

This edited volume gathers seven case studies of rivalries between countries in Asia, including India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, China and India, China and Taiwan, and China and Vietnam. The United States also figures: most directly in a study of Chinese–US rivalry and also as a patron in the rivalry between the two Koreas and in the China–Taiwan rivalry. The case studies provide a basis for assessing whether and how each country's domestic politics influenced interstate threat perceptions and conflict intensities—particularly in terms of Putnam's concept of “two-level games,” which highlights competition among domestic political elites as a factor in foreign policymaking. The editors of Asian Rivalries stress that the case studies represent only a “preliminary foray” into the causes of rivalry dynamics. However, they conclude that two-level games, and domestic politics more generally, are not a significant factor in these cases. The reasons for this negative finding likely relate to the substantial numbers of authoritarian regimes among the countries that make up the rivalry dyads and the corresponding autonomy of the decision makers concerned, as well as the absence of factionalized competition, outbidding, diversionary tactics, and threat inflation that widen the scope for domestic political influence on national security policies.