Abstract

This paper is an overview of the Asian currency crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997–1998, with an emphasis on the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It provides a detailed account of the development of the crisis and analyses and evaluates the content of IMF advice and its consequences. The size of the IMF package for each of these three countries is judged to have been too small. This paper also has a comparative perspective; the Mexican crisis is reviewed as a precursor to the Asian crisis to see what the IMF learned, and how it prepared, for future crises. The causes of the crises and IMF conditionality for the post‐Asian crisis countries, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina, are also compared to the Asian crisis countries. By agreeing to maintain a fixed exchange rate, for example, the IMF is judged to have been “softer” in its approach to the post‐Asian crisis countries.

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