ASEAN states’ responses to China-driven regional cooperation initiatives: the BRI and the CSD revisited

Abstract

ABSTRACT This research contributes to an understanding of the ‘intertwined destiny’ of China’s twin initiatives, the BRI and the CSD. We find that the security implications of the twin initiatives drive different patterns of responses among ASEAN states. The dynamism emanates from diversifying preferences of ASEAN states amid complex interdependence. The BRI does a better job of projecting China’s material and soft power, as it aligns closely with ASEAN states’ comprehensive national interests. The CSD fares less well because it seeks to impose Beijing’s hegemonic claims on the SCS, thereby posing a security challenge to claimant states in the region. The nuances suggest that the charm of the BRI cannot be readily converted into a passport for the CSD. For some ASEAN states, power asymmetry inherent in their relations with China requires a security commitment from this giant northern neighbour, which Beijing is still reluctant to provide.