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Abstract
The ascription of normative mental states is an integral part of the psychology of development and personality. Pragmatic rules for the ascription of mental states are outlined and a distinction is made between direct and counterdefined mental states. According to these rules, counterdefined mental states can only be ascribed to persons in a meaningful way when certain conditions hold. Violations of the rules are called pseudoascriptions. Six counterdefined groups of mental states are discussed: secure, self-confident, authentic, free, intentional and identity. It is argued that certain psycho-social conditions create the need for ascriptions of these mental states, and that pseudoascriptions give rise to Cartesian narratives of the self. The rules for the ascription of counterdefined states has implications for the universality claims of normative descriptions of developmental psychology.
Published Version
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