Abstract

Ascending price auctions involving a single price path and buyers paying their final bid price cannot achieve the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) outcome in the combinatorial auctions setting. Using a notion called universal competitive equilibrium prices, shown to be necessary and sufficient to achieve the VCG outcome using ascending price auctions, we define a class of ascending price auctions in which buyers bid on a single price path. Truthful bidding by buyers is an ex post Nash equilibrium in such auctions. By giving discounts to buyers from the final price, the VCG outcome is achieved for general valuations.

Highlights

  • Ascending price auctions are preferred over their sealed-bid counterparts in practical settings [10, 9, 26]

  • We provide a relaxation of the traditional definition of ascending price auctions to retain a single price path but allow for final payments to be determined as an adjustment from clearing prices

  • We introduced a class of efficient ascending price combinatorial auctions

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Summary

Introduction

Ascending price auctions are preferred over their sealed-bid counterparts in practical settings [10, 9, 26]. For a general private valuations model, i.e., with no externalities and free disposal but no other restrictions on valuations (such as requirements that items are substitutes of each other), there is a negative result due to de Vries et al [11] They show that gross substitutes valuations are almost the largest valuation domain for which an ascending price auction can achieve the VCG outcome. Our main contribution is a broad class of ascending price auctions which achieve the VCG outcome for general valuations using a single price path. Auctions based on primal-dual algorithms are believed to have faster convergence properties [11] In both cases, we present the first ascending (multi-item) Vickrey auction for general valuations with a single price path.

The Model
Quasi-linear Utility
Zero Seller Valuations
Vickrey Payments and UCE Prices
Examples
A Class of Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions
A Relaxed Definition of Ascending Price Auctions
Insufficiency of Simpler Prices
A General Class of Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions
Incentives
Discussion
Adjusted Buyers via a Primal-Dual Algorithm
The Primal-Dual uQCE-Invariant Auction
A Clinching Interpretation
An Example
Extending the iBundle Auction
A Clinching Interpretation of iBEA
Summary and Open Questions

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