Рarties to constitutional proceedings as subjects of proof

Abstract

In conditions of concentrated review, the specificity of constitutional proceedings leads to a limitation of the limits of maneuvers provided to participants in the judicial process. Although the subjects of the constitutional process can be defined as real parties, their function remains limited. The existence of a dispute explains and justifies the development of an adversarial procedure that imitates the general principles of procedural law applied in ordinary courts. Constitutional justice has both subjective and objective consequences. As a result, the constitutional process appears as a place of indirect protection of the Constitution, where the individualistic concerns of the parties are mixed with the protection of the common good. Naturally, the parties are the first to be affected by this duality. Their action is primarily aimed at the protection of personal interests, but it also gives the constitutional judge the opportunity to ensure the objective protection of order. Thus, the simultaneous presence of subjective interests and the general interest gives an ambivalent character to constitutional disputes. Although it is impossible to eliminate this duality, it has been possible to give priority to the objective dimension of the dispute. The conflict between the participants in the legal process is consonant with the legal process, it is the origin and driving force of the proceedings. In response to this logic, the founder and legislator tried to recreate before the constitutional courts the conditions for a real dispute between the parties. For this purpose, the constitutional procedural texts define the persons and bodies that have the right to participate in the consideration of the case, taking care of the appointment of participants in the judicial process with opposing interests. Whatever the legal field, the legal process always takes the form of a confrontation, a struggle that takes place with the help of legal arguments. From this point of view, a trial is really a confrontation directed procedure. Proceedings are the arena of this organized struggle between two parties with opposing claims. The constitutional process also follows this model. It should be recognized that the specifics of the judicial process require certain adaptations to the principle of competition, but they do not go so far as to eliminate the structural element of the judicial process, namely the opposition of the parties. In constitutional disputes, the contradiction concerns the divergent interpretation of the Constitution.