Abstract
The present paper aims at reconstructing a conception of descriptive analysis that Brentano and the early Husserl share. According to this shared conception, the descriptive analysis consists in the articulation of the multilayered part-whole structure of consciousness. Focusing on the problem of intentional reference, we show how they, to carry out descriptive analyses thus defined, make different distinctions among parts of consciousness. We further show how such a difference is closely connected to the two philosophers’ views on the nature of intentional reference.
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