Abstract
The Nash Demand Game (NDG) has been one of the first models (Nash in Econometrica 21(1):128–140, 1953. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906951) that has tried to describe the process of negotiation, competition, and cooperation. This model has had enormous repercussions and has leveraged basic and applied research on bargaining processes. Therefore, we wonder whether it is possible to articulate extensive and multiple developments into a single unifying framework. The Viability Theory has this inclusive approach. Thus, we investigate the NDG under this point of view, and, carrying out this work, we find that the answer is not only affirmative but that we also advance in characterising viable NDGs. In particular, we found foundations describe the distributive Bargaining Theory: the principle of movement and the principle of chance and necessity. Finally, this initial work has many interesting perspectives. The probably most important idea is to integrate developments of the Bargaining Theory and thus capture the complexity of the real world in an articulated way.
Highlights
The seminal work of Nash (1953) posed three important questions that remain open in distributive Bargaining Theory: How to reach an equitable agreement? How to discriminate between multiple equilibria? How do bargainers come to a break in a negotiation process? in the original game proposed by Nash
The Nash Demand Game raises fundamental questions that have prompted a variety of research agendas, including the axiomatic proposals we summarised in the previous subsection
The Nash Demand Game (Nash 1953) posed three important questions that remain open in distributive Bargaining Theory: How to reach an equitable agreement? How to discriminate between multiple equilibria? How to a negotiation breakdown is reached? The present work has been motivated to answer these questions
Summary
The seminal work of Nash (1953) posed three important questions that remain open in distributive Bargaining Theory: How to reach an equitable agreement? How to discriminate between multiple equilibria? How do bargainers come to a break in a negotiation process? in the original game proposed by Nash The seminal work of Nash (1953) posed three important questions that remain open in distributive Bargaining Theory: How to reach an equitable agreement? How do bargainers come to a break in a negotiation process? In the original game proposed by Nash Dr Rudolf Vetschera of the University of Vienna for his hospitality and for the valuable and motivating interaction without which this work would not have been possible. Nash Demand Game), there is a multiplicity of equilibria that implies an infinite continuum of agreements
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