Article Commentary: Levels of Analysis and Personality: Lessons from the Person-Situation Debate?

Abstract

In a recent article, Funder (1991) contends that global as opposed to narrow personality traits provide appropriate level of at which personality research should begin. heuristic value of generalized personality dispositions as exemplified by fivefactor model of personality (Digman, 1990) is considerable. Yet, Funder's preemptive assertions bring to mind polemic exaggeration of person-situation debate. Although such rhetoric may stimulate productive inquiry, it seems unlikely that scientific monism will, in itself, promote richest possible understanding of important issues facing personality psychology. Brevity precludes of each of Funder's assertions. Instead, this commentary examines central epistemological claims. 1. For purposes of explanation, most important traits are global but for purposes of prediction, narrower better (p. 35). Funder accords global traits superior ontologic status on grounds that they alone provide bona fide power to explain behavioral consistency. More narrow traits, by contrast, are dismissed as tautological. By illustration, Funder differentiates between global trait of social skills which explains behavior across a wide range of settings and narrow trait of social skill at parties which describes (but does not explain) behavior. This distinction possesses a certain prima facie appeal. It may be inaccurate to claim, however, that either global or narrow traits as defined in this manner possess explanatory power. Rather, they constitute descriptions of apparent consistency at differing of specificity. Although Funder has countered that of regularity is not distinct from of regularity (p. 35), this position seems itself circular. An alternative view of levels of analysis issue focuses not on distinction between explanation and description but on that between bandwidth and fidelity (Cronbach & Gleser, 1957). From this vantage point, selection of an optimal level of always requires some compromise between applicability and specificity. Interestingly, recent research on structure of trait hierarchies has indicated that people show preferences for midlevel personality constructs rather than those that exist at either narrow or highly global of (John, Hampson, & Goldberg, 1991). 2. The source of trait constructs should be life and clinical experience, as filtered by insightful observers (p. 36). Funder contends that construct development should stem from ordinary intuition inasmuch as common sense provides roughly accurate organizations, whereas mechanical procedures like factor can result in esoteric, nonintuitive constructs (p. 36). This assertion has several problematic aspects. First, although common sense merits attention in construct development, veracity of folk wisdom is routinely overestimated. It is possible to cite numerous, if not innumerable, examples of common sense gone awry (see Locke & Latham, 1991). Moreover, many of putatively esoteric, narrow traits cited by Funder, e.g., subjective expectations, praxernia, might be more aptly viewed as instances of arcane labeling rather than evidence of nonintuitive nature of narrow traits. In practice, terms used to denote global traits can also be impenetrable to uninitiated. By way of example, term surgency (one of five o-called fundamental dimensions of personality) is quite likely more abstruse to lay public than many of its subordinate constructs. Similarly, extraversion (an alternative label for same general domain) is deceptively nonintuitive in that it encompasses far more than lay notion of outgoingness. Finally, it is noteworthy that five-factor model of personality favored by Funder was identified via factor of narrowly defined terms, attesting to potential value of mechanical procedures as well as research programs that begin at narrow of analysis. Ironically, Funder's own conclusions regarding person-situation debate may be equally germane to incipient controversy (e.g., Briggs, 1989) regarding level of question: the time has passed . . . when it (is) useful to make invidious comparisons . . . such arguments are as between straw men, and more constructive issues remain to be explored (Funder, 1983, p. 288).