Art in the Law

Abstract

The problem of defining art has been a perennial one for philosophers and artists. In recent years with the development of new types of artistic productions the older definitions have been cast aside since they have not been able to absorb the new content [1]. While the philosophic debate has gone on, legislators, judges and civil servants have been confronted with many of the same problems in aesthetics faced by philosophers and artists and have attained their own answers, often with surprising results. The legal answers to limiting the scope of art were obtained by enacting and interpreting laws relating to 'art', 'artists' and 'works of art'. Naturally the legal discourse is on a lower level of aesthetic sophistication; instead of the philosophers' references to the life and work of Shakespeare, Mozart, Goethe, Balzac, Van Gogh, etc., the legal discussion concerns the creations and transactions of entities such as Restawile Upholstery Ltd, Ladbroke (Football) Ltd, and Spicer's Dress Designs [2]. Also the legal decisions in most cases do not concern true works of art but are confined to mundane, commercial items such as furniture, clothing, and other mass-produced articles. Nevertheless, the legal answers, if not completely satisfactory for philosophers, should be of interest and value to philosophers, and are vital to creative artists. The legal answers are important because the legal decision-making process is in direct, everyday contact with the world of art, and thus the legal decision reflects a contemporary social assessment of problems in art. The task of this article is to outline how the law has defined art and answered problems in aesthetics. The non-lawyer will be on familiar ground because many of the problems faced by the law are virtually the same as those faced by philosophers. Besides outlining the legal answers, the article will assess the limitations of legal incursions into aesthetics.