Art and Belief

Abstract

In this volume, the contributors discuss a variety of philosophical issues concerning art and belief. Very roughly, the issues can be divided into three groups: the issues in epistemology (e.g., ‘Can we acquire justified belief or knowledge through fiction?’) [Section I and II of the volume]; the issues in philosophy of mind (e.g., ‘What does the experience of fiction tell us about the nature of beliefs?’) [Section III]; and the issues in aesthetics (e.g., ‘Is testimony capable of justifying beliefs about the aesthetic value of an artwork?’) [Section IV]. The three groups are not completely independent from one another; indeed, they are interrelated in many ways. For example, a question in epistemology is whether or not the beliefs we acquire in response to our experience of fiction can be justified. This question presupposes a view in philosophy of mind that we do acquire some beliefs in response to our experience of fiction. Again, testimony is a key factor both in the issues in epistemology and the issues in aesthetics. This means that the issues in epistemology and the issues in aesthetics are partly determined by a common factor—namely, the nature of testimony.