Arsenal of Democracy: The American Automobile Industry in World War IICharles K.Hyde. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University, 2013.

Abstract

Arsenal of Democracy: The American Automobile Industry in World War II Charles K. Hyde. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University, 2013.Arsenal of Democracy reports on an era in American history with which many readers think they are familiar. Between 1939 and 1944, American industry -particularly the automobile industry-increased its output from twenty percent of the world's munitions to forty-two percent. No other belligerent nation was able to approach those figures.Charles Hyde focuses specifically on the automobile industry's role in this massive change of purpose. He cites earlier, broader histories of this shift, especially the changes in other American industries and the resulting social and economic effects. Hyde is well situated for his specific focus, having written histories of Chrysler, Dodge, Nash, and Hudson. Moreover, he has accessed dozens of collections of primary sources on the automobile industry during the war years.This shift in manufacturing began in the 1930s to meet the demands of the Lend-Lease Program. What Hyde calls production miracles began to be possible with several novel, cooperative relations that had developed between the military, industry, suppliers, unions, and the federal government (xv). Develop is an important word here: the process was not simple or smooth. Despite bureaucratic and technical challenges, despite confusing contract terms (eventually cost-plus - fixed-fee), increased geometrically. There was none of the profiteering seen in World War One; instead, for example, the cost of a B-24 Liberator dropped from $379,000 in 1941 to $215,000 in 1944. And pre-war competition was replaced with cooperation, as in the example of the ubiquitous Jeep: American Bantam produced 1500 units, Ford another 295,000, and Willys another 352,000.The auto industry manufactured other material, but Ford's Willow aircraft plant is Hyde's case study. Ford PR claimed Willow was building a B-24 roughly every hour, but Ford needed thirty-eight months to reach these numbers; Willow produced only fifty-six planes in 1942. Ford insisted on auto methods rather than aircraft industry methods (Ford engineers would not understand Consolidated blueprints). The less-familiar General Motors-Grumman partnership used smaller, existing factories, adopting Grumman assembly methods. GM's quick rampup stands in sharp contrast to the long gestation... at Willow Run (109). Ford's management team, dysfunctional to the point of fistfights, caused Roosevelt -whom Henry Ford hated-to consider removing Ford as CEO of his own company. …