Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862 (review)

Abstract

80CIVIL WAR HISTORY Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862. By Thomas Lawrence Connelly. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967. Pp. xvi, 305. $8.50.) In his preface Thomas Lawrence Connelly observes that "the history of the Army of Tennessee, unlike that of its companion in arms, the Army of Northern Virginia, has been rather badly neglected." Stanley F. Horn's Army of Tennessee, first published in 1941, is the only full-length book on the subject, and although well written it is deficient from a scholarly standpoint . Yet, as Connelly also points out, the operations of the Army of Tennessee were as important strategically (if not politically) as those of Lee's forces, its military task actually far more difficult. With fewer numbers it was required to defend an area ten times larger than the Virginia theater and served by an inferior transportation system. In addition it was constantly handicapped by poor leaders, lack of governmental support , and political interference. As a result it was rarely victorious and often defeated; nevertheless it fought valiandy to die end, its soldiers sustained —not by the inspiration of a Lee or Jackson—but by an unshakable faith in themselves. Connelly (the author of that enjoyable satire on the Civil War Centennial , WtU Success Spoil Jeff Davis?) has undertaken in this, the first of a proposed two-volume study, to give the "army of the heartland" its rightful place in Civil War historiography by presenting a fresh, comprehensive, and critical account of its campaigns, battles, and leaders. On the whole he succeeds admirably. His analysis of the geographical, economic, and psychological factors that moulded Confederate strategy in the Tennessee Valley is a thoroughly original contribution, both in conception and information presented. The same can be said regarding the section on the formation and early history of what became the Army of Tennessee. Here in particular he reveals the key role of Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee and of the influence of public opinion on the deployment of Confederate forces (e.g., pressure from the "Memphis lobby" helped lead to an overconcentration of troops along the Mississippi and thus set the stage for Grant's breakthrough along the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers). Although he deals with extremely complex operations, his descriptions are clear, concise, and quite readable. Undoubtedly the outstanding feature of the work is Connelly's evaluations of the personalities and performances of the various commanders of the Army of Tennessee. These are invariably perceptive, frequently iconoclastic , and almost always critical. He is especially harsh with Albert Sidney Johnston, who emerges as weak-willed, befuddled, and dominated by his nominal subordinate, the ambitious and conceited Beauregard. On the other hand, while noting Bragg's numerous mistakes, he rejects the standard view that the failure of the Perryville campaign was primarily the fault of that unfortunate general. Kirby Smith and the Richmond authorities, he argues, must share much of the blame. And, finally, he has done a truly monumental amount of research, particularly in manuscript sources, and as BOOK REVIEWS81 a result not only does he present important new facts but demolishes certain old myths. Just to cite one example, despite having been written about many times, it is not until now that we have the full and true story of the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson. Of course the book is not without some errors and defects. Contrary to what is reported on page 239, Sterling Price did not refuse to join Van Dom in a move through West Tennessee, nor did Van Dom stop Price "on the eve of a march on Nashville." Connelly, in his desire to be fair to Bragg, is perhaps unjust to Kirby Smith; certainly one will find a fundamentally different account of Kirby Smith's role in the 1862 Kentucky campaign in Joseph Parks's biography. Although the book contains five maps, the reader will find it advisable to have a Civil War atlas at hand. And Connelly has a habit of citing sources in manuscript even when they are readily available in print. Unless there are serious textual differences between the original and published versions, this practice would seem to be...