Arms Control and Treaty Verification

Abstract

Methods of detection unique to arms control and treaty verification are discussed here. The conditions and opportunities for detection in these enivronments are contrasted with portal monitoring and cargo screening environments. First, neutron multiplicity counting is covered, including both the technology involved and the mathematics required. Next, the Pu300, Pu600 and Pu900 plutonium analyses are explored. Next, neutron imaging methods are discussed from the historical perspective in the context of counting the number of warheads on a missile. The necessity for “information barriers” in this application is discussed. The use of anti-neutrino detectors to verify the operating power level of a nuclear reactor is also covered, and successful experiments of this technology are described. The dependence of the neutrino signal on the uranium-to-plutonium fission rate is discussed, and a simple analytical model for quantifying this effect is presented.