Arms as Influence

Abstract

One justification for U.S. arms transfers is that the United States can manipulate its arms exports to make the recipients of American aid comply with American wishes. This article explores the conditions under which such arms influence attempts succeed. Sixteen potential determinants are discussed, drawn from the attributes of the influence attempt, the recipient, the interaction of the recipient and supplier, the supplier, and the systemic environment. A data set of 191 American arms influence attempts from 1950 to 1992 is presented. Using logit analysis, the variables are tested against the outcome—success or failure—of the influence attempt. Successful influence attempts are more likely when the United States used promises or rewards, focused on altering the recipient's foreign policy, made the attempt on civilian regimes, supplied more of the recipient's arms, and made attempts in the first half of the cold war era, when the United States was generally more powerful.