Arms and Influence: British arms policy and the decline of British influence in the Middle East, 1948-49

Abstract

This article examines the impact of the 29 May 1948 United Nations arms embargo on Israel and the Arab League states during the first Arab-Israeli war (1948-49). The war was the direct result of Britain’s failed mandate over Palestine between 1923 and 1948. The arms embargo was a manifestation of Britain’s imperial retreat in the Middle East, exemplifying Britain’s post-war decline in the region. This article focuses on Britain’s foreign relations with Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan because Britain was treaty-bound to supply arms and ammunition to them. It also examines the fraught relationship between London and Washington over the Palestine question, and emphasises how the British and American governments were able to agree on the maintenance of the arms embargo despite their differences over the future status of Palestine. The embargo was also an early example of the unequal nature of the post-war “special relationship” between Britain and America because British diplomats were negotiating from a position of weakness. The embargo was a complete failure. While well intended, it had detrimental implications for Britain’s standing in the Middle East. Britain’s failure to support Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan during the first Arab-Israeli war undermined its credibility as a reliable ally, showing the Arabs that their interests were secondary to the political