Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses

Abstract

Since earliest times national leaders have believed that “if you seek peace, prepare for war.” In the twentieth century, this belief has been challenged by those who see military “overpreparedness” not as a deterrent, but as a trigger for war-provoking arms races. This article attempts a comparative empirical test of these “preparedness” and “arms race” hypotheses with reference to serious great power disputes since 1816. It was found that, contrary to the prediction of the preparedness hypothesis, a crisis was no more likely to escalate to an all-out war when the “revisionist” great power possessed a significant military advantage vis-a-vis its “status quo” rival. Escalation was no more likely when the revisionist power was improving its relative position, nor when the revisionist power was both relatively stronger and increasing its lead. On the other hand, the existence of an arms race between the two powers prior to the dispute was very strongly associated with its subsequent escalation to full-scale hostilities. The implications of these findings for current policy debates are noted.