Aristotles Weak Akrates: What Does Her Ignorance Consist In?

Abstract

This chapter starts with a controversial set of assumptions about Aristotle’s treatment of akrasia . The chapter argues that Aristotle accepted neither the Socratic nor the Humean view but developed his own strikingly original alternative. There is a serious problem for any cognitivist interpretation of the weak akrates which allows that she puts together major and minor premises, reaches the conclusion but still fails to know it. The examples which Aristotle offers of knowledge failure in NE/EE VII 3 do not pinpoint precisely the type of intellectual failure suffered by the weak akrates . The chapter argues that if Aristotle adopted a certain view of desire in De Anima , then he could account for the knowledge failure of the weak akrates and the success of the practically wise in a way other than that proposed by either cognitivist or Humean interpreter. Keywords: Aristotle; cognitivist interpretation; De Anima ; Humean interpreter; knowledge failure; NE/EE VII 3; Socratic view; weak akrates