Aristotle’s Account of the Socratic Elenchus

Abstract

Abstract In his Topics and Sophistical Refutations Aristotle describes a method of enquiry and of proof which he calls ‘dialectic in the strict sense and peirastic’ (SE 34, i8339I). He claims not to be inventing this method but to be giving, for the first time, a descriptive codification of the rules for the proper practice of a method already widely in use (SE 34, i83is ff.). No close student of the Topics and Sophistical Refutations can doubt that the early Platonic dialogues, and thus the method practiced there by Socrates, served as one of Aristotle’s main sources of information about the method which he describes. Ample confirmation of this, if it be needed, will be provided in the course of the discussion here. If, however, Aristotle gives us a descriptive account of the rules of the method which Socrates uses, but hardly himself describes, then Aristotle’s account ought to be one of our main sources for understanding Socratic method. In particular, since Aristotle, in the Sophistical Refutations, describes at length the rules for the use of his method for the practice of elenchus this discussion ought to be one of our main aids for solving long-standing problems concerning the Socratic elenchus.