Aristotle’s Way away from Parmenides’ Way. A Case of Scientific Controversy and Ancient Humour

Abstract

Abstract In Physics Α, Aristotle introduces his science of nature and devotes a substantial part of the investigation to refuting the Eleatics’ theses, and to resolving their arguments, against plurality and change. In so doing, Aristotle also dusts off Parmenides’ metaphor of the routes of inquiry and uses it as one of the main schemes of his book. Aristotle’s goal, I argue, is to present his own physical investigation as the only correct route, and to show that Parmenides’ “way of truth” is instead both wrong and a sidetrack. By revisiting Parmenides’ metaphor of the route, Aristotle twists it against him, distorts it and uses this distortion as a source of fun and of some mockery of Parmenides himself. Thereby, Physics Α gives us a taste of Aristotle’s biting humour and of his practice of the “virtue” of wit (eutrapelia).