Aristotle’s Ethics and Medieval Philosophy: Moral Goodness and Practical Wisdom by Anthony Celano

Abstract

Reviewed by: Aristotle’s Ethics and Medieval Philosophy: Moral Goodness and Practical Wisdom by Anthony Celano Matthew R. McWhorter Aristotle’s Ethics and Medieval Philosophy: Moral Goodness and Practical Wisdom. Anthony Celano. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 272 pp. Anthony Celano’s Aristotle’s Ethics and Medieval Philosophy is a recent collection of studies from a veteran scholar of medieval philosophy who has conducted more than thirty years of research into the ethical doctrine of Aristotle and its reception by thirteenth-century Latin thinkers. Celano observes that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is the seminal kind of cultural achievement that admits of numerous interpretations and developments (7). At the same time, Celano promotes a central thesis in this volume that underscores that the content of the Ethics must be differentiated from how it was understood by medieval commentators. The hermeneutical key that should be used to understand Aristotle’s original doctrine, Celano contends, is one that recognizes practical wisdom (phronesis) as having a broader scope than that which was admitted by the medieval commentators, a scope that includes the ability to originate moral norms (viii–ix). In contrast, Aristotle’s medieval commentators were influenced in their reading of the Ethics by the natural law doctrine found in Scripture and Patristic thinkers (5) and as found in the works of Cicero and Seneca (238). The medieval commentators, Celano maintains, read Aristotle with an “acceptance of natural law and synderesis” and, due to these presuppositions, subsequently “transform Aristotle’s Ethics from one based upon a human standard into one that depends upon a divine foundation” (viii). The interpretational result is a truncated understanding of practical wisdom that is no longer recognized as able to originate “moral universals,” that is restricted to the prudential ability to apply the “eternal principles of action” (ix). Elsewhere, Celano refers to this as “the evolution from practical reason to prudence” (241). He points to Albert the Great as the primary medieval thinker who significantly restricted the scope of practical wisdom in this regard (169). Celano’s volume is divided into nine chapters. The work includes selections from Aristotle’s Greek and extensive Latin quotations, as well as frequent citation of relevant English and international secondary sources. Celano begins his study by briefly outlining certain moral topics that can affect one’s interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics. These topics include how one understands the nature of happiness (eudaimonia), the relation of Aristotle’s ethical doctrine to a natural moral law, and the structure of moral acts. Celano then provides a longer treatment of the issue of happiness in connection [End Page 1430] with Aristotle’s doctrine of practical wisdom. The study then shifts and proceeds chronologically through the works of important thirteenth-century thinkers. His third chapter begins this chronological survey by focusing on William of Auxerre and Philip the Chancellor. The fourth chapter examines commentaries on the Ethics authored prior to 1248 (an anonymous commentary, a commentary ascribed to Robert Kilwardby, and the pseudo-Pecham commentary). Celano then dedicates two chapters to Albert the Great and his treatment of Aristotle’s Ethics. This discussion is followed by a chapter focused on Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, and then a chapter examining two late-thirteenth-century commentaries, one of which is ascribed to Parisian arts master Radulphus Brito. Celano closes the volume with a short concluding chapter that returns to discuss in part the themes outlined in his first chapter (namely, the issues of natural law and practical wisdom). Celano states that he developed this book out of a desire to understand what he describes as Aristotle’s two different accounts of happiness that are found in separate sections of the Nicomachean Ethics (vii). These distinct accounts, Celano maintains, also indicate different understandings of human goodness (23). He contends that one account, in book 1, describes happiness as resulting from a combination of contemplative and practical activities (2). Reading the Ethics in light of this first account results in what Celano (appropriating terminology from W. F. R. Hardie) calls the “inclusive” interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of happiness (2 and 16). In contrast, a second account that Aristotle provides, in book 10, describes happiness as the result...