Aristotle on Universals

Abstract

ARISTOTLE ON UNIVERSALS THE CENTRALITY 0£ the ' one-many' problem or ' problem 0£ universals ' to epistemology and metaphysics is hardly an issue £or argument. Questions regarding the metaphysical status 0£ universals and their relation to individuals, the process 0£ ' concept formation,' and the epistemological £unction 0£ universals in predication are classic ones in philosophy having originated with Socrates and Plato. In view 0£ the contemporary interest in these problems as well as the numerous studies 0£ other topics treated 0£ by Aristotle, it is a matter £or at least initial surprise that there exists no systematic account 9£ his views on universals. This is partially explicable by the £act that these questions are not dealt with by Aristotle in any single treatise or place in his works; indeed, texts relevant to these problems are scattered throughout them all, from the Categories to the Poetics, and even the fragments. In addition, many 0£ the texts are, as one might expect, obscure, and some apparently contradict others. Another £actor which might help explain the situation is that there is a traditional, 'orthodox' interpretation 0£ Aristotle's thinking on these matters, which gives rise to the impression that whatever he has to say on the topic is already known in sufficient detail, has been fully considered, evaluated, and refuted , so that it would be pointless to pursue the matter further . This impression has little basis in £act. The 'orthodox' interpretation has it that Aristotle is a ' moderate realist,' holding that universals exist somehow ' in ' individuals.1 Taken as it stands, this interpretation is worse than unhelpful. It does 1 This view is propounded, for example, by Whitney J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem of Value (Princeton, 1963), p. 182; Ralph W. Clark, "Saint Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Universals" The Monist, 58 (1974), p. 163; many other examples could be cited. 135 136 EDWARD REGIS, JR, not tell us what a universal is, just that whatever it is, it exists 'in' things. The truth is that Aristotle's theory of universals has never been satisfactorily stated by his interpreters, and its adequacy as a general solution to the problems associated with universals has not been fairly assessed. Our object in this paper is to present an interpretation of Aristotle's theory of universals which is detailed, precise, and based upon the relevant texts from the entire corpus. That is, we will not limit our discussion to the Categories only, or to the Metaphysics only, but will attempt to integrate the appropriate texts from many works into a unified and consistent doctrine. We shall consider, in order, the ontological status of universals and their relation to particulars, the psychological processes by which universals come to exist in the soul, and the role played by universals in knowledge. The theory which will emerge is, in brief, as follows: that universals for Aristotle exist only in the mind, not' in things' (although there is a basi,s for them in things), that universals arise in the mind through numerous inductions of particulars, and, contrary to the usual view, that it is universals which in fact make knowledge of individuals possible. Aristotle's theory is important, we shall conclude, because it does justice to the empirical facts, and to the requirements of scientific knowledge. I From the time of Porphyry onward, discussions of Aristotle's conception of a universal have centered about what occupies less than twenty lines in Bekker's text, a portion of chapter two of the Categories. We begin, then, with, an examination of these lines, for the core of Aristotle's theory is indeed to be found there.2 In this chapter Aristotle gives what appears to be an exhaustive classification 'of things' (Twv ovTwv) determined by • Whether or not the Categories is an authentic work of Aristotle's, it has been commented upon by interpreters and taken as if were a genuine work, and we shall do so here. ARISTOTLE ON UNIVERSALS 137 two principles 0£ division: being 'said 0£' (A.eyerm) and being 'in' (ev) a subject (v1ToKeiµh ypaµ,µ,anK~, translated as "a piece 0£ grammatical knowledge" (Cooke), " a certain point 0£ grammatical knowledge " (Edghill) ) is in a subject, the...