Aristotle and the Virtues, by Howard J. Curzer

Abstract

‘Aristotle is the father of virtue ethics, and virtue ethics is hot’ (p. 1). The enticing opening line of Howard Curzer’s new study illustrates the style and approach of his investigation. Curzer has published widely on topics related to Aristotle’s account of the virtues, and in this expansive book, he defends a conception of Aristotle’s project that aligns with that of contemporary virtue ethicists. The aim is to shed light on Aristotle’s ‘opaque’ account of the individual virtues, by which Curzer means the virtues of character Aristotle presents in books III, 6 – V of the Nicomachean Ethics. The intellectual virtues are mostly given walk-on parts. In the opening chapter, Curzer describes himself as a ‘drag-Aristotle into current-debates sort of guy’ in contrast to antiquarians, who wish to ‘situate dead philosophers within their historical context’ (p. 7). Curzer is not particularly interested in textual issues; those looking for philological flair are better served elsewhere. The aim is to defend Aristotle’s insights. Whether historical discernment and philosophical insight are mutually exclusive aims is open to debate, but Curzer’s accessible style will nevertheless appeal to a wider readership than traditional commentaries. His cast of characters includes virtues like courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, and magnanimity, but also less glamorous virtues like wit, friendliness, and truthfulness. In the first part of the book, Curzer patiently and perceptively explains the character and subject matter (‘peri ho’) of each virtue. He defends a ‘doctrine of disjoint spheres’ according to which each virtue has its own domain of feeling and action that does not overlap with that of any other. Although some virtues are inextricably tied to Aristotle’s political environment (magnificence just is not the same state without the institution of liturgies), Curzer treats Aristotle’s virtue theory as a live option for those seeking a template for a life well lived. Indeed, he declares that ‘my Aristotle differs from contemporary virtue ethicists no more than they differ from each other’ (p. 7). In light of this attitude, it is a pity that Curzer never defends the claim that Aristotle is the father of virtue ethics. Nor does he specify what virtue ethics is. In recent years, a number of scholars have questioned Aristotle’s alleged paternity, for instance Gerasimos Santas in ‘Does Aristotle Have a Virtue Ethics?’ (in Virtue Ethics, ed. D. Statman, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1997, pp. 260–85) and Iakovos Vasiliou in ‘Aristotle, Agents, and Actions’ (in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. J. Miller, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 170–90). It would have been reassuring to see an explicit defence of Curzer’s overarching claim. The fact that ‘virtue’ is a central concept in Aristotle’s ethics is not decisive — whether Aristotle is in fact the father of virtue ethics would depend, inter alia, on the kind of role that character plays in the justification of action and whether Aristotle treats ‘virtue’ as a basic concept in his ethical theory, or whether virtue is rather to be analysed in terms of more fundamental categories, like state (hexis), wish (boulêsis), deliberation (bouleusis), and decision (prohairesis), as Aristotle seems to hold in EN II, III and VI. Curzer discusses the reciprocity of the virtues in the final part of the book, as well as the relationship between prudence and virtue of character, but his analysis of intellect’s role in practical life seems underdeveloped.