Aristotle and the Sacrament of the Altar: A Crisis in Medieval Aristotelianism

Abstract

In the Anglican theological circles in which I move, the doctrine of transubstantiation is apt to be declared guilty by association with its Aristotelian underpinnings, most notably its ‘out-moded’ substanceaccident ontology. These negative assessments, based as they usually are on cursory acquaintance with the theory’s most enthusiastic medieval exponent, Thomas Aquinas, abstract from historical complications. For eleventh-century theologians had already debated the manner of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist: whether it was merely symbolic (as Berengar of Tours was accused of holding) and/or spiritual (as some passages of St. Augustine would suggest); or whether the Body and Blood of Christ were really present in the Eucharist under the forms of bread and wine? Once the Church pronounced in favor of ‘the real presence,’ several competing theories were advanced to explain it: (i) ‘impanation,’ according to which the Body of Christ assumed the substance of the bread, the way the Divine Word assumes Christ’s human nature; (ii) ‘annihilation,’ according to which the substance of the bread is annihilated; (iii) ‘consubstantiation,’ which stipulates that the substance of the bread remains and the Body of Christ coexists with it; and (iv) ‘transubstantiation,’ which says the bread is neither annihilated nor remains, but is converted into the Body of Christ.