Aristotle and the Comic Hero

Abstract

I have argued elsewhere for a theory of Aristotelian comedy that uses virtue of eutrapelia (ready-wittedness) as central notion.' On such a theory, comedy's function is to critically assess when failures to hit have occurred and to make mock of such vices. I also argue that virtue of eutrapelia embodied in art of comedy functions as a species of equity (epieikeia), a supplementary procedure whereby apparent violations of letter of law are either forgiven or condoned by virtue of being in accord with spirit of law. However, some critics have claimed that this Aristotelian notion of comedy (as satirical exposure of harmless vices) may allow for some affection for buffoon, but it has no room at all for of comic hero. The apotheosis of buffoon, Falstaff, it is argued, can only be for Aristotle someone to be pitied, since he is embodiment of anarchic excess; after all, only balance found in virtue can be celebrated by Aristotle. Thus his notion of comedy is found wanting since it can only be negative and not positive in its critical thrust. I want to argue in this essay, however, that Aristotle's theory does allow for celebration of comic hero as a function of moral imagination's quest to foster virtue. How idealizing apparent excesses of comic clown can help reader or audience more easily to hit will be challenging thesis this essay hopes to demonstrate. Along way I also want to show how Aristotle's theory of moral imagination can illuminate role played by romantic heroes and monsters in our quest to be virtuous and avoid vice. To accomplish these goals, I will first summarize findings of my previous study on Aristotelian comedy and laughter. Then I will consider in depth criticisms made by those who advocate a celebratory view of comedy. Finally, I will examine some key passages in Aristotle which have been often overlooked and misunderstood as a basis for defending paradoxical position that vice (buffoonery) can indeed be very means for achieving virtue. Eutrapelia as a Species of Phronesis The early loss of all manuscripts of Aristotle's Poetics II, in which he deals systematically with genre of comedy, has long resulted in less interest by critics in his theory of laughter in comparison to their avid concern for his theory of tragedy. Nevertheless, I think Umberto Eco's best-selling novel, The Name of Rose ( 1983), has helped launch a revival of interest in Aristotle's theory of comedy, since it centered around recovery of Poetics II in a fictional medieval monastery. A year later, Richard Janko published his own reconstruction of this lost masterpiece based on his claim that an anonymous manuscript on comedy, thought by some to be a mere Byzantine forgery, is actually an authentic reflection of Aristotle's Poetics II and fully in accord with those references to comedy and laughter which have survived in rest of Aristotle's corpus,2 Aristotle describes virtue of eutrapelia in his Ethics IV.8.3 He regards this virtue of ready-wittedness as tactful way of making and appreciating humorous jests in everyday conversation or art itself (in the old and new comedies). The critical function of this ready wit is to fill us with delight by pointing out ridiculous in human affairs. Like all Aristotelian virtues, it constitutes mean between two vices. On one extreme is buffoon who vulgarly and improperly carries humor to excess, irrespective of how it might hurt someone else. He or she simply fails to see that some things, e.g., tragedies, should be taken seriously, that there are things lawgivers forbid us to abuse. On other extreme is boor who is incapable of making or appreciating humor, someone who is so overly serious and finds fault with everything that he is unable to have any comic sympathy with human foibles. …