Abstract

Understanding the dynamics of argumentation systems is a crucial component in the development of computational models of argument that are used as representations of belief. To that end, in this article, we introduce a model of Argument Revision, presented in terms of the contraction and revision of a system of structured argumentation. Argument Revision is influenced by the AGM model of belief revision, but with certain key differences. First, Argument Revision involves modifying the underlying model (system of argumentation) from which beliefs are derived, allowing for a finer-grained approach to modifying beliefs. Secondly, the richer structure provided by a system of argumentation permits a determination of minimal change based on quantifiable effects on the system as opposed to qualitative criteria such as entrenchment orderings. Argument Revision does, however, retain a close link to the AGM approach to belief revision. A basic set of postulates for rational revisions and contractions in Argument Revision is proposed; these postulates are influenced by, and capture the spirit of, those found in AGM belief revision. After specifying a determination of minimal change, based on measurable effects on the system, we conclude the article by going on to show how Argument Revision can be used as a strategic tool by a participant in a multi-agent dialogue, assisting with commitment retraction and dishonesty. In systems of argumentation that contain even small knowledge bases, it is difficult for a dialogue participant to fully assess the impact of seemingly trivial changes to that knowledge base, or other parts of the system; we demonstrate, by means of an example, that Argument Revision solves this problem through a determination of minimal change that is justifiable and intuitive.

Highlights

  • Connections between argumentation and belief revision have recently found new momentum [23, 24, 26] with the emergence of two broad approaches—the use of argumentation to support belief revision (e.g. [25, 31]) and the use of belief revision operators to model change in argumentation systems (e.g. [4, 14, 39]).The dynamic argumentation framework defined in Argument Theory Change (ATC) [35, 39] is based on Dung-style abstract frameworks [22] but incorporates a model of dynamics

  • In systems of argumentation that contain even small knowledge bases, it is difficult for a dialogue participant to fully assess the impact of seemingly trivial changes to that knowledge base, or other parts of the system; we demonstrate, by means of an example, that Argument Revision solves this problem through a determination of minimal change that is justifiable and intuitive

  • This is achieved through a specification of modular argumentation theories; (ii) refining the types of Argument Revision into those that more closely reflect those found in AGM belief revision— revision and contraction; (iii) proposing a set of postulates for rational revisions and contractions in Argument Revision; and (iv) showing how dishonesty can be used as an alternative to retracting existing commitments in dialogue

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Summary

Introduction

Connections between argumentation and belief revision have recently found new momentum [23, 24, 26] with the emergence of two broad approaches—the use of argumentation to support belief revision (e.g. [25, 31]) and the use of belief revision operators to model change in argumentation systems (e.g. [4, 14, 39]). The work in this article is built on our previous work in [42, 43] in four ways: (i) by extending Argument Revision to allow rules, preferences and contraries to be revised as well as the knowledge base This is achieved through a specification of modular argumentation theories; (ii) refining the types of Argument Revision into those that more closely reflect those found in AGM belief revision— revision and contraction; (iii) proposing a set of postulates for rational revisions and contractions in Argument Revision; and (iv) showing how dishonesty can be used as an alternative to retracting existing commitments in dialogue.

Argumentation
Belief revision
Belief revision and argumentation
Modular Argumentation Theories
Strict and defeasible inference rules
Extended Argumentation Frameworks
Argument contraction and revision
Argument contraction
Argument revision
Process and properties of argument revision
Change graphs
Constructing change graphs
Postulates for Argument Revision
AGM postulates for belief revision
24 Argument Revision revision is an Argumentation Theory:
The Levi Identity
The Harper Identity
Measuring minimal change
Argument Revision in dialogue
Commitment retraction
Dishonesty
Why be dishonest?
Dishonesty in dialogue
Related work
10 Conclusions
A A Proofs
Full Text
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