Argument Evaluation in Philosophy: Fallacies as Strategic Maneuvering

Abstract

In order to gain a better understanding of philosophical dialogues as critical discussions, this paper focuses on the evaluative strategies that philosophers use in their argumentation, and especially in the charge of committing a fallacy. In order to illustrate some problems with the evaluation of philosophical arguments, the charge of committing a genetic fallacy is analyzed. It is argued that the charge of committing such fallacy could be better understood as a case of strategic maneuvering. Some historical evidence is presented in favor of this grasp by revisiting the controversy given rise to over the genetic fallacy around the nineteen fifties and sixties. An account of charging the other party of committing a genetic fallacy as strategic maneuvering is presented, and some ways in which such maneuver could derail are analyzed. To conclude, some general remarks are made regarding the use of (certain) fallacies in philosophical controversies and some valuable consequences of considering philosophical arguments as strategic maneuvering are stated.