Abstract

AbstractOur conventional wisdom about animal ethics, as embodied in the animal welfare position, is that animals are not things to whom we can have no moral obligations. Animals who are sentient, or subjectively aware, have a morally significant interest in not suffering. But, because they are not self-aware, they do not as an empirical matter have an interest in continuing to live. So we may use and kill animals as long as we do so ‘humanely’ and do not impose ‘unnecessary’ suffering on them. There are at least two serious problems with our conventional wisdom in this regard. First, because animals are chattel property, we undervalue or ignore their interests in not suffering. Second, we cannot justify the view that animals who are sentient do not have a morally significant interest in continuing to live. If animals are not things and matter morally, our institutionalized exploitation of them cannot be justified, and veganism is a moral imperative.

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