Abstract
This study shows that investment decisions drive tail risks (i.e., systemic risk and stand-alone tail risk) of TBTF (Too-Big-to-Fail) banks, while financing decisions determine tail risks of non-TBTF banks. After the Dodd-Frank Act, undercapitalized non-TBTF banks continue to gamble for resurrection, and their stand-alone tail risk become more sensitive to funding availability and net-stable-funding-ratio than TBTF banks. We show that implementing a slimmed-down version of TBTF regulations on non-TBTF banks cannot efficiently contain the stand-alone risk of non-TBTF banks and cannot eliminate TBTF privilege. Moreover, non-TBTF banks together generate larger pressure of contagion on the real economy, and they herd more when making financing decisions after the Act. Our findings highlight the need for enhanced regulations on the liability-side of non-TBTF banks.
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