Abstract

In ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ Quine is concerned to combat what he calls ‘dogmas of empiricism’. The first of these is the belief that there is ‘some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic or grounded in fact’. The second is ‘the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience’ (p. 20). He calls this latter the dogma of reductionism.KeywordsLogical PropositionLogical TruthSemantical RuleLogical NecessityContingent TruthThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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