Abstract
We study whether teams are conditional cooperators in a one-shot public goods game and to what extent this conditionality differs from that when decisions are made by individuals. Using a laboratory experiment, we find individuals in teams under a majority rule do not exhibit significantly different levels of conditionally cooperative behavior than individuals in isolation. Whereas individuals in teams under a random ballot rule are less conditionally cooperative than individuals in isolation.
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