Abstract

Since ethical concepts are not empirical concepts, bridge principles cannot be found in the class of empirical laws, neither of the deterministic nor of the statistical sort. If we draw the parallel to scientific theories, then ethical norms and values have to be considered as theoretical concepts, like the concept of force in Newtonian physics. In science, laws containing such theoretical concepts are confirmable only in an ‘indirect’ holistic way, via the confirmation of the entire theory. One might conjecture that ethical theories, containing synthetic bridge principles as a part, can be justified in a similar manner. Do we find here a last ‘rescue’ for the possibility of an intersubjective justification of ethical theories? This last possibility shall be investigated in this last chapter of our study.KeywordsScientific TheoryTheoretical ConceptEthical TheoryEthical NormEmpirical PhenomenonThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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