Abstract
Structural first-price auction estimation methods, built upon Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), have provided prolific empirical findings. However, due to the unobserved nature of underlying valuations, the assumption of BNE is not feasibly testable with field data, a fact that evokes harsh criticism of the literature. To respond to skepticism regarding credibility, we provide a focused answer by analyzing estimates derived from experimental asymmetric auction data in which researchers observe valuations. We test the statistical equivalence between the estimated and true value distributions. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the distributional equivalence, strongly supporting the credibility of structural asymmetric auction estimates. The Supplement for this paper is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400104
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