Abstract
The nature of species names has been a source of controversy, and has played a role in developing ideas about the status of species, such as the species-as-individuals hypothesis. Some argue that species names are Millian proper names: names that have no meaning. Others have countered that species names are Millian general names that have stipulative definitions. Here I argue that species names belong to neither category. In particular, unlike Millian proper names, species names have unique referents and are connotative. Further, species names are names of intension that, unlike Millian general names, refer to specific collective entities. Because species names have unique properties not associated with Millian general or proper names, but recognizing the similarity to proper names in most respects, I propose that they be categorized as extra-proper names.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
