Are smart sanctions smart enough? An inquiry into when leaders oppress civilians under UN targeted sanctions

Abstract

Why do some UN targeted sanctions (or “smart” sanctions) cause collateral damage to the general population, while others minimize it? We suggest the scope and the effectiveness of smart sanctions, as well as the political institutions of target countries, are critical determinants of sanctions’ adverse effects on human rights. Leaders targeted by sanctions with a broad scope will have a greater incentive to oppress people to ward off potential support for challengers. The degree to which they can carry out successful oppression, however, hinges upon the effectiveness of the implementation of sanctions. Furthermore, we expect that authoritarian systems are more likely to encourage oppression than other ones. We conduct a quantitative analysis of 56 UN-imposed smart sanction episodes. Our study reveals sanctions with a broad scope that are less effective result in deteriorated human rights conditions, especially in authoritarian countries. However, we find when sanctions with a narrow scope work effectively, they do not hurt innocent citizens.