Abstract

In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like “blue” and “red”. This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of “learning” are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot “learn” a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a distinction, we can and do sometimes “learn” a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional “abstractionist” views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about “abstracting” concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about “the learning-nonlearning distinction”.

Highlights

  • As I will use terms, to ‘‘have a concept’’ of something is to be able to think about that thing

  • The view that we do not ever learn a concept of blue from experiences of blue, and that this is not even possible, has in recent years been widely accepted in science and philosophy

  • I shall not defend these suggestions; I just note the possibility that experience-based sensory concept acquisition is an interestingly special case where a set of characteristics that are typically all present together or all absent together fails to be so

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Summary

Introduction

As I will use terms, to ‘‘have a concept’’ of something is to be able to think about that thing. Fodor characterises concept learning as ‘‘computational’’, ‘‘intentional’’, ‘‘cognitive’’ and ‘‘in the domain of cognitive psychology’’ (1975, 93, 2008, 136–7, 139, 151–2), and concept acquisition that is not learning as ‘‘automatic’’, ‘‘noninferential’’, jumpy,2 ‘‘brute-causal’’ (1981, 273), and as ‘‘merely triggered’’ by circumstances (1981, 275). Many of them have accepted Fodor’s view that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts, like ‘‘blue’’ and ‘‘red’’.3. A second type of theorist accepts ManyPrimitive but urges, contrary to PrimitiveNotLearned, that primitive concepts come in two different types: Some primitive concepts, like ‘‘horse’’ and ‘‘carburettor’’, can be learned. This kind of view is held by Eric Margolis (1998), Stephen Laurence and Margolis (2002), Margolis and Laurence (2011), Susan Carey (2009, 2014, 2015), Daniel Weiskopf (2008), and Kim Sterelny (1989), all of whom more-or-less clearly suggest that the class of primitive concepts that cannot be learned includes sensory concepts like ‘‘blue’’.5

To give the flavour of one such view
Terminology
Fodor’s Argument for PrimitiveNotLearned
We Can and Do Sometimes Acquire a Concept of Blue from Experience
Is Acquiring a Concept of Blue from Experience an Instance of Learning?
Geach on ‘‘Abstractionism’’
Concluding Remarks
Full Text
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