Are Retaliatory Trade Measures Justified Under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards?

Abstract

In March 2018, the United States adopted measures to increase tariffs on a range of imported steel and aluminum products, claiming that the measures are justified for its national security concerns. Several WTO Members, including the European Union, India, Russia, Turkey, and China, have argued that the U.S. measures are in violation of WTO rules on safeguard measures and adopted retaliatory measures invoking Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards. The United States argues that its measures do not constitute safeguard measures under WTO rules, and, therefore, the retaliatory measures are not justified under the Agreement on Safeguards. This article reviews relevant cases and examines whether the U.S. measures are safeguard measures under the Agreement on Safeguards and whether the retaliatory measures are also justified under the Agreement on Safeguards. The article also discusses the need for regulatory reform to address the issues with unilateral trade measures and retaliation.