Abstract
Human high-level cognitive decisions appear sub-optimal (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Paradoxically, perceptuo-motor decisions appear optimal, or nearly optimal (Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2008). Here, we highlight limitations to the comparison of performance between and within domains. These limitations are illustrated by means of two perceptuo-motor decision-making experiments. The results indicate that participants did not optimize fundamental performance-related factors (precision and time usage), even though standard analyses may have classed participants as ‘optimal’. Moreover, simulations and comparisons across our studies demonstrate that optimality depends on task difficulty. Thus, it seems that a standard model of perceptuo-motor decision-making fails to provide an absolute standard of performance. Importantly, this appears to be a limitation of optimal models of human behaviour in general. This, in conjunction with non-trivial evaluative- and methodological differences, suggests that verdicts favouring perceptuo-motor, or perceptual, systems over higher-level cognitive systems in terms of level of performance are premature.
Highlights
There appears to be a striking dissociation between human perceptuo-motor- and cognitive decision-making performance
Cognitive decision-making ability is widely viewed as distinctly less than optimal, because it conflicts with the normative prescriptions of decision theory that set out how ‘rational’ decision makers should behave (Birnbaum, 2008; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)
Few reasons are evident for why perceptuo-motor decision-making should be optimal, while cognitive decision-making is sub-optimal
Summary
There appears to be a striking dissociation between human perceptuo-motor- and cognitive decision-making performance. Assessment of performance typically differs in two ways across cognitive and perceptual/perceptuo-motor studies: quantitative versus qualitative violations of normative theories and presence or absence of system constraints. Our experiments suggest that people’s perceptuo-motor decisions are suboptimal in ways not captured by Trommershäuser et al.’s (2003a, 2003b) model Together these results, we think, suggest that claims of greater optimality for perceptual systems over higher-level cognitive systems may be premature. Given that there are many aim points, participants are in effect choosing between many different options of the form: reward with probability p = X, penalty with p = Y, both reward and penalty with p = Z This is recognized as a traditional decision-making problem (see e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
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